| SCA War & Manoeuvre Warfare |
| SCA Combat and Armour |
| Written by Mynjon du Jardin |
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This article will discuss the concept of manoeuvre warfare and its possible application to the medieval battlefield using the Battle of Agincourt as an example. Battle in the SCA context will then be looked at from the manoeuverist perspective and ask the question if manoeuvre is a necessary part of SCA combat. Manoeuvre Warfare TheoryModern military theory defines two ways of conducting war and battle – Attrition and Manoeuvre. Attrition is attempting to win by the most direct approach, usually a head on assault that overwhelms the enemy and usually results in a large number of casualties, often on both sides. Many battles in medieval warfare used the attritionist approach and were conducted face to face and the fastest, strongest, numerically superior, most combat skilled or luckiest side won. Manoeuvre warfare is the art of placing an enemy in a position where he can not win and then choosing to attack. The finest demonstration of manoeuvre warfare is where a force places it’s enemy in such an untenable position that the enemy capitulates prior to the engagement because it is completely unable to respond. Manoeuvre warfare goes beyond attacking an enemy at a time and place of your own choosing and tries to completely incapacitate the enemy prior to ever coming into contact with them. Manoeuvre warfare is undertaken by attacking an opponent’s Centre of Gravity (COG). The COG is that characteristic, capability or locality from which a military force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight – that without which a force is no longer capable of success at that level of conflict. COG can be determined at one several levels of conflict. For example at the individual level the pikeman’s COG may be range. If you get inside the range of a pikeman he is no longer capable of attacking or defending himself and is no longer capable of success. The pikeman’s centre of gravity, range, is the key thing that if you undermine he will lose. At the unit level an example may be the Scottish schiltron of the 13th century. The COG of this hedgehog-like formation was the compact forest of spears that held out the English cavalry. If the schiltron broke up from this compact formation into individual pikemen they could be ridden down by the English cavalry. The COG for the Scottish pikemen as a unit was their ability to maintain cohesion. If everything else failed, as long as they maintained their COG by maintaining formation they still had the ability to be successful – as demonstrated at the Battle of Bannockburn. If the English had effectively deployed projectile weapons such as archers this would have undermined the cohesion of the Scottish schiltron. If the Scottish did break up it then became a question of the individual pikeman’s COG and his ability to keep the cavalry at range and not allowing the horsemen inside the pike range either from a flank, in front or the rear. Just because manoeuvre warfare is more efficient and in many cases more effective does not mean that battles cannot still be won in by the attritionist method of warfare. If you throw enough combat force at an enemy you will eventually overwhelm them but the cost of that victory may exceed the benefit achieved, giving a Pyrrhic victory where you exhaust your own resources in the process of winning. Regardless of how well a unit manoeuvres, if the enemy has unlimited resources to throw at the problem eventually they will be defeated. The more cost effective manner of achieving victory is to manoeuvre into a position where victory is assured for an acceptable cost. The Battle of Agincourt
On the day of the battle, when the two forces shaped up, the two opposing Armies had distinctly different COGs.
The ground at Agincourt was soft and boggy from rain the night before which slowed down the charge, giving the English more time at range, therefore enhancing their COG. Further to this, the French charge was channelled down a narrow front from a single direction, allowing the English bowmen to focus their weight of fire on a single narrow front. Even once the French had reached the English lines across the boggy ground, through the arrow storm, the English archers had erected stakes which prevented the French cavalry from charging through their line. These combined factors undermined the French COG by preventing them from ever effectively delivering their shock impact. The result was a crushing defeat for the French. To achieve tactical manoeuvre the French could have swung the third echelon around to either the rear, a flank or to the English camp and attacked either mounted or dismounted. This may have diverted enough of the archer’s weight of fire away from the front to allow a frontal charge to reach it’s conclusion and deliver the necessary weight of impact to break the English line. Once the English front was broken successive successful charges would be able to occur because the archers would be unable to deliver the weight of fire to stop them while simultaneously defending against the cavalry that was inside their line. This would have a compound effect as each successful delivery of a charge further shattered the English formation. If the English chose to ignore the flank or rear manoeuvre they risked not being in a position to defend against a charge into one of their vulnerable areas where weight of fire could not be focussed. Alternate French Strategic Manoeuvre Opportunities. At the strategic level the French could have attacked the English strategic COG by just staying put and fixing the English in their position in the knowledge that the English would be vulnerable if they attempted to manoeuvre away from their prepared stakes and the defendable ground. If the English did not move from their vital ground that would also achieved the French strategic aim as the English would sicken and starve in location if they did not march on to Calais. Time was on the side of the French. Alternate French Tactical Manoeuvre Opportunities. At the tactical level the French could have struck at the English camp to destroy their stores and rations to further starve and weaken them and then attack them later when they were reduced to a pitiful level through lack of food. These alternate courses of action do not require the French to directly engage the English but prevent the English from bringing their COG to bear and also minimise French casualties. These alternate strategies of manoeuver did not even seem to be considered. Hindsight is perfect and it is easy to look back on a battle and see the ‘obvious mistakes’ of the commanders on the ground. Armchair experts abound and this discussion on Agincourt has been to highlight the possibilities on manoeuvre warfare rather than to indicate they either viable (without having actually been on the ground at the time) or were a ‘superior’ way the respective commanders chose to conduct the Battle of Agincourt according to the historical record. Medieval War Mentality. So there is the opportunity to achieve the mission and spare hundreds of lives but the French do not see the opportunity or fail to use it. This is an example of what could be considered the Western European psychology in medieval war. Ambush is the coward’s way, striking from the rear is for common to criminals and those of low birth. For the medieval commander the manner which victory was achieved was as important as the victory it’s self. To prove ones self in battle the combatant must engage an equal or superior in equal combat and best them in a fair fight. Killing archers and peasants really did not count. If the French had taken the English from a flank or starved them out it would not have been true victory in the minds of the Chivalric purist. Only the attritionst direct charge into the face of extreme danger could demonstrate the strength and honour of the flower of French chivalry. In a society where honour could be seriously considered to be worth more than life it’s self this precluded the French cavalry from using manoeuvre warfare to achieve their objective. Manoeuvre in SCA War
There is no strategic manoeuvre in SCA warfare. SCA war is conducted at the unit or sub-unit level and there is often no strategic objective. The objective in SCA manoeuvre is traditionally tactical such as capturing a flag, killing a King, holding a piece of ground for a period of time, crossing a bridge etc. This limits the level at which a Unit Commander can conduct manoeuvre operations. Identifying the Enemy COG. When considering how to use manoeuvre at the unit level the commander must first identify his own COG and that of the enemy. This consideration takes into account all the aspects of the situation. Even if the commander is not in charge of a formed unit and has only loose control of a an ad-hoc group that has been thrown together for the occasion things such as high ground, obstacles, archer support or other factors that are external to the non-homogenous nature of the unit may constitute the COG. If it is a well established group it will have probably developed a style and character that not only gives it strength but for an opponent can opportunities to find weakness. Below are some of the War Units common to the Northern Lochac battlefield. The assessment of their COG is just that, an assessment and not a fact. This is merely an example and whether you personally agree or disagree is superfluous to the exercise. *Picture – Vebntbarre.jpg*
So What? In the minds of all great commanders the question is not the identification of facts but the understanding of what it all means and how they can use it for their advantage. In the thoughts of Sun Tzu one does not attack the enemy at their strongest point. As an individual you do not run into the middle of the Louvain checkerboard formation and take them on where they have space to move and surround you. A small unit of four fighters armed with Florentine axes should not throw themselves at the centre of the Venbarre shield wall, etc. One must look at the way a unit works and where it’s strengths and COG are and how to undermine that. Do not engage Louvain at close range, just shoot them with archers from a distance and in the same manner don’t waste arrows on the Ventbarre shield wall, get a group of friends and make a mad dash around a flank faster than the flank can turn. Situational or Environments Effects on COG. A unit COG may be modified by their situation or environment. Regardless of a unit’s style their COG in a Bridge Battle is the geography of the bridge. If you do not hold the bridge you fail in your mission so the bridge will be the COG by default. Also let’s face it, there are only so many ways you can attack and hold a single bridge that is three meters wide. Multiple bridges offers multiple means of approaching the problem but sometimes the scenario or environment will limit the opportunities for manoeuvre. In a ‘Kill the King’ scenario the COG becomes the King because it does not matter what other brilliant tactical and individual moves you make, if the King is dead you have failed or succeeded respectively. In this manner sometimes the unit’s normal COG is superseded by a COG imposed by the environment. Enhancing COG. Once the friendly COG is identified then techniques to enhance that strength can be considered. In the case of Ventbarre all wearing easily identifiable tabards that allow the unit to reform quickly if separated. If the COG is unit cohesion then adopting methodologies to enhance that cohesion improves combat power. For Riverhaven adopting communication strategies that allow the three elements of the combined arms team to convey their intent and requirements so they do not become separated or disjointed in the delivery of their attack. These are simple and self evident techniques that are adopted not through some stroke of tactical brilliance but simply because they make sense. Do We Want to Manoeuvre? Manoeuvre warfare is all about winning in a resource reasonable manner, avoiding battles that can not be won while achieving victory at minimum cost. This is an approach to war fighting that was developed well after medieval period in terms of having an systematic approach to war from the individual level all the way through to the national/strategic level. If what we are recreating is the honour and style of the elite nobility engaged in medieval style war then only really minor tactical manoeuvre is appropriate. If in an SCA ‘Capture the Castle’ war scenario the attacking army decides it will be more resource efficient, in terms of casualties, to surround the castle and starve out the defenders then it is going to be a really slow and uninteresting day on the war-field. Mission. Some of the individual actions we observe on the war-field we salute for their attritionist lunacy, such as the four Florentine axmen charging the centre of the Ventbarre shield wall. They are all going to die, it is going to spectacular and messy but they are all going to die and this is where the question of the mission arises. The mission of the army in on the SCA war field is to win the scenario. That army is made up of individuals who all have individual missions and varying degrees of commitment to the army mission. Some are just out for a bit of biff, some are out for the challenge of defeating their peers and superiors and some unfortunately to win at all costs. If the most important thing to a particular individual is the achievement of their individual mission, which may be to die in the most spectacular way possible, then the charge of the Florentine axes is a mission success for the individual. Their army may have been defeated but they achieved what they regarded as success in their mission. They may have even had to manoeuvre to get to a position where they could get a clear suicide run at the shield wall of choice, without getting cut down by archer fire and before the shield wall was engaged by another shield wall. Manoeuvre theory relies on the fact that the tactical, operational or strategic mission is the also the most important mission to the individuals that make up the respective formations. On the SCA war field that is not necessarily true. We all like to win but sometimes the glory of the shockingly attritionist death is of equal or greater value. Conclusion
In situations where victory over the enemy is the sole objective that drives the mission, manoeuvre warfare is the only logical manner in which to conduct operations. In the SCA war scenarios there are other significant individual and cultural factors to be taken into account when considering how to conduct manoeuvre. Manoeuvre can be used as an effective battlefield methodology to gain an advantage over an enemy while still allowing enjoyable quality combat to take place. Appropriate use of manoeuvre at the unit tactical level combined with an acceptance that sometimes attritionist engagements are just a normal part of SCA and medieval warfare will considerably enhance the overall enjoyment of the SCA war fighting experience. Bibliography
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